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Chapter 7 
Clinical Ethics Support in Contemporary Health Care: 
Origins, Practices, and Evaluation 
Evan Doran, Ian Kerridge, Christopher Jordens, and Ainsley J. Newson (2016) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter concerns current initiatives to create and maintain specialized services to help 
respond to ethical issues that arise in the practice of health care. These initiatives, the obstacles 
they face, and the controversies they engender should be of considerable interest to those 
concerned with the management of health care organizations. This is because ethics is and 
should be intrinsic to routine health care practice. Also, no less, it is because ethical disputes 
and controversies, even if they seldom occur, can severely disrupt the complex organizations 
that deliver health care in modern societies. 
Clinical ethics support services (CES services) are comprised of an individual or group, 
usually in an organization, who can provide a suite of services to support all stakeholders in 
identifying and managing the ethical issues that inevitably arise in the design and delivery of 
health care. While there is a degree of consensus about the potential value of such services, 
they are also the focus of ongoing theoretical, methodological and political debates. This 
chapter does not aim to resolve these debates. Rather, our aim is to provide health care 
managers with an account of how and why CES services are becoming a part of the 
contemporary organizational landscape of health care, and describe the concerns that 
bioethicists and observers and critics of bioethics have raised regarding their role, function, and 
dissemination. 
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We first describe the origins of CES services, to provide a context for the following 
discussion about the goals, functions and models of support that exist across this discipline—
drawing on some relevant examples. We then describe how CES services can be evaluated. 
Third, we discuss initiatives that aim to optimise quality of CES services and some of the 
criticisms and suspicions that these initiatives have engendered. Finally, we offer some 
reflections on the direction that CES services may take in the future. 
The Origins of CES Services 
Clinical ethics support is derived from the discipline of bioethics, which, at least as it applies to 
the health care sector, can be defined as the study and critical appraisal of ethical, legal, social 
and political issues arising in the delivery and management of health care and research. 
Bioethics operates in three distinct spheres: academic, policy and clinical. The incorporation of 
bioethics into clinical practice to improve patient care (clinical ethics) may be seen as a 
continuation of the tradition of medical ethics—the means by which the medical profession 
itself has attended to ethical problems that arise in practice (Dzur, 2002; Pellegrino, 1988; 
Moreno, 2009). However it can also be seen as a significant departure from that tradition. 
Bioethics is an interdisciplinary enterprise in which philosophers, lawyers, social scientists and 
the public engage with biomedical researchers and clinicians. Bioethics has thus opened up the 
ethics of medical encounters and biomedical research to external ethical scrutiny and critique 
and so represents a break in the tradition of medical ethics (Dzur, 2002). 
Histories of bioethics offer a variety of explanations for its emergence during the 
twentieth century. In some accounts (e.g., Callahan, 1999), bioethics emerged from biomedical 
researchers and clinicians reaching out to non-medical disciplines such as philosophy and law for 
support with the perplexing moral choices imposed by new medical technologies. In other 
accounts (e.g., Rothman, 1992; Bosk, 1999) bioethics emerged as a response to medical scandals 
such as the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, with critics both within and outside 
medicine concerned to more closely monitor biomedical research and practice. Bioethics is also 
seen to emerge (e.g., Jonsen, 1993) from increased secularism and greater awareness of moral 
pluralism. Intellectual histories of bioethics have also associated it with the rise of new social 
movements of the 1960s, such as the civil rights movement, feminism and environmentalism, 
which questioned all forms of authority and called for the public to have a greater say in 
institutional decision-making (Dzur, 2002). 
Similarly, accounts of the emergence of CES services point to the technological and 
social changes that have increased the ethical complexities of patient care (Aulisio, Arnold, and 
Youngner, 2000; Agich, 2005; Larcher, Slowther, and Watson, 2010). Advances in specialties 
such as critical care, reproductive medicine, fetal medicine and genetic testing, have led to new 
treatments that blur important boundaries (e.g., between life and death) and create 
unprecedented ethical and legal dilemmas around issues such as withdrawing/withholding care. 
Diversity of values in society is reflected in the clinical setting; also compounded by differences 
between the health professions, and institutional and systemic imperatives (Aulisio, Arnold, and 
Youngner, 2000). As a number of authors (e.g., Zussman, 1997; Royal College of Physicians, 
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2005) have noted, clinical relationships have changed: medicine has lost some of its authority; 
paternalism is yielding to “partnership” and shared decision-making with better educated 
patients and more assertive “consumers”; nursing is more professionalized. The medical 
encounter is increasingly crowded with competing interests and influences. Clinical transactions 
usually involve third party payers such as governments or private insurers, making clinical work 
increasingly subject to scrutiny from these and related institutions. The ethical issues that arise 
as a result are not confined to the clinic, but often attract intense scrutiny from the media, from 
religious authorities and from the law. As a result, clinical decisions (such as a withholding 
treatment) can become the focus of far-ranging public debates. 
CES services first emerged in a few hospitals in the USA in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Moreno, 2009; Tapper, 2013). According to several scholars (e.g., Cranford and Doudera, 1984; 
Rosner, 1985; Jonsen, 1993; Rubin and Zoloth, 2004), the catalyst for the growth of CES services 
was the judgement of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the case of Karen Quinlan in 1976. This 
case was prompted by a disagreement about whether to withdraw ventilation support from a 
young woman who was in what would now be called a minimally conscious state. Quinlan’s 
parents asked her doctors to cease ventilation, but her doctors refused to do so, due to 
concerns about their legal liability. The case was the first legal adjudication on life-support in the 
US and it generated intense public interest (Jonsen, 1993). In a landmark decision, the Court 
found in favour of extubation, drawing on a paper by Teel (1975) which argued that doctors 
frequently face difficult ethical and legal decisions in end-of-life care, which they are ill-
equipped to deal with. Teel argued for greater access to mechanisms for support such as the 
then novel hospital ethics committees (Tapper, 2013; Engelhardt, 1999). The judgement in the 
Quinlan case included a recommendation that clinical ethics committees be established to offer 
doctors guidance in such cases. 
The Quinlan case is significant as it is frequently cast as emblematic of the factors that 
precipitated the spread of CES services. The case is often cited to show how physicians reached 
out for assistance with the perplexing choices created by advances in medical technology. 
Tapper (2013) uses the case to argue that the advent of extreme life-prolonging measures 
created a yearning among clinicians to share the responsibility for the tough decisions these 
technologies imposed. ECs were “[b]orn to serve the dual and reinforcing fears of futile care and 
medicolegal liability” (Tapper, 2013, 417). In other histories, the Quinlan case represents the 
moment medical ethics became a more public affair and the “internal morality” of medicine 
opened up to the norms and values of the wider community (Pellegrino, 1988; Bosk, 1999; Dzur, 
2002; Rubin and Zoloth, 2004). For Engelhardt (1999) the Quinlan judgment represents the point 
at which moral authority within health care could, and should, be transferred from clinicians, 
patients and their families to CES services “in the name of oversight and the protection of 
patients” (Engelhardt, 1999, 92). For Jonsen (1993) the Quinlan case heralded a “culture 
sensitive… to the rights of individuals and their abuse of powerful institutions” and stimulated a 
movement committed to vigorously asserting the “needs and preferences of patients” (1993, 
S3). 
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The Quinlan case and a later series of Baby Doe cases (also involving the withdrawal of 
life supporting interventions) gave momentum to the idea that clinical ethics committees 
provided an alternative to resolving medico-ethical disputes in courts of law. 
The idea of CES services was taken up by the President’s Commission for the Study of 
Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which recommended 
that health care institutions explore the use of ethics committees for decisions regarding 
incapacitated patients (Agich, 2009a; Dzur, 2002). Momentum grew to effective mandate when 
in 1992 having an institutional means of addressing the ethics of patient care was made a 
requirement of hospital accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care 
Organisations (Agich, 2009a, 2009b; Pope, 2009). This event, more than any other, induced the 
rapid spread of CES services in the US, to the extent that they have become an almost 
ubiquitous feature of health care organizations in this country. The most recent US national data 
indicated that 81% of general hospitals have an ethics consultation service and a further 14% 
are in the process of establishing a service (Fox, Myers, and Pearlman, 2007). 
Following these early US developments, CES services have now become established in 
many other nations—with the experience and knowledge gained in the US motivating the 
creation of services elsewhere (Slowther, Hill, and McMillan, 2002; Pfafflin, Kobert, and Reiter-
Theil, 2009). CES support is now a feature of at least some hospitals in Australia, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, to name just a few (McNeill, 2001; 
Meulenbergs, Vermylen, and Schotsmans, 2005; Aleksandrova, 2008; Gaudine et al., 2010; 
Frikovic and Gosic, 2006; Guerrier, 2006; Louhiala et al., 2011; Wenger et al., 2002; Hurst et al., 
2007a; Akabayashi et al., 2008; Bankauskaite and Jakusovaite, 2006; Dauwerse et al., 2011; 
Macdonald and Worthington, 2012; Hurst et al., 2008; Slowther, McClimans, and Price, 2012). 
Accounts of the emergence of CES in these nations (e.g., Beyleveld, Brownsword, and 
Wallace, 2002; Dorries et al., 2011) are similar to US histories in attributing their emergence to 
factors such as advances in biomedical technologies, moral pluralism (there being more than 
one view on an issue that could be said to be reasonably held), the rise in patient rights and 
medical scandals. The developmental trajectory has been quite different, however. With the 
exception of Norway, Belgium, Greece (where they have legal status) and Spain, most nations 
have not made CES services mandatory for hospitals (Lebeer, 2005). Rather, CES services have 
developed in an ad hoc and sporadic way; usually led by motivated clinicians (Beyleveld, 
Brownsword, and Wallace, 2002). Even here, however, most countries have witnessed the 
gradual emergence of CES services. In Canada, a survey by Gaudine and colleagues found that in 
2008 85% of hospitals had an ethics committee compared to 58% in 1989 and 18% in 1984 
(Gaudine et al., 2010). A recent survey of clinical ethics committees in the UK showed the 
number of identified committees to have risen from 20 in 2001 to 82 in 2010 (Slowther, 
McClimans, and Price, 2012). Clinical ethics networks have also been established in Europe with 
the European Clinical Ethics Network (Fournier et al., 2009) and in the UK with the United 
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Kingdom Clinical Ethics Network (UKCEN) in an attempt to embed clinical ethics as a core 
element of health care systems (Slowther, 2008). 
The spread of CES services internationally shows that the idea of having available some 
manner of expert ethical support, has clearly taken hold (Aulisio, Arnold, and Youngner, 2000; 
Gill et al., 2004; Agich, 2005; Royal College of Physicians, 2005; Williamson, McLean, and 
Connell, 2007; Larcher, Slowther, and Watson, 2010; Dorries et al., 2011). In the next section we 
will describe some of the major, common features of CES services. We start, however, by noting 
that there is continuing debate on foundational issue of CES services—what goals can and 
should a service strive to meet. This issue partly explains the somewhat precarious institutional 
existence of such services, at least in some jurisdictions. 
Goals, Functions, and Models of CES Support 
Goals 
The commonly stated or implied goals of support services include: minimising the distress and 
conflict that clinicians and patients experience when faced with ethically difficult clinical 
decisions (Yen and Schneiderman, 1999); improving the quality of patient care (Slowther, 2008); 
controlling health care costs; reducing complaints; reducing litigation and the costs associated 
with it; reducing the fear of litigation; increasing trust in health care professions and institutions; 
creating better decision-making processes; facilitating decision-making where there is 
disagreement; creating a greater focus on patient-centred outcomes; reducing the frequency of 
intractable or unresolved disputes; improving staff morale; developing policies and practices 
that reduce risks to health care organizations, and promoting greater understanding of ethics 
(Nelson et al., 2010a). 
Whilst there is broad acceptance of the potential value of CES services, the 
characteristics of existing services reflect a plurality of visions and values. For CES services can 
be envisaged as a service accessible to clinicians (and perhaps patients as well); or as a 
watchdog for the ethical quality of patient care; or as a champion of patient rights, or as a 
means of risk management and legal cover for their institutions. These various visions of CES 
services can be classified in different ways. Beyleveld, Brownsword, and Wallace (2002), for 
example, identify two main categories. The first is “bottom-up” and clinician-oriented, while the 
second is “top-down” and managerial. The first category describes settings where enthusiasts 
for clinical ethics are likely to have established a CES service; while the second describes those in 
which CES support has been encouraged or mandated by an entity other than those who form 
the service itself. 
These categories highlight the fact that CES services can serve different purposes: they 
can help clinicians to deal with ethically complex issues; and/or they can help health care 
organizations manage risks and crises (Beyleveld, Brownsword, and Wallace, 2002). While these 
different goals are not mutually exclusive, sometimes they conflict. Thus questions about what 
CES services can and should do are political as well as theoretical and technical. Clinical ethics 
support is not politically innocent (Dzur, 2002; Brecher, 2006; Engelhardt, 2009); there are 
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always partisan ideas, interests and agendas at work and it is possible for CES services to be 
“captured” in the interests of some at the expense of others. 
Functions 
There are three main functions typically associated with CES: education, policy development and 
case consultation (Singer, Pellegrino, and Siegler, 1990; Blake, 1992), although a fourth—
providing assistance with organizational ethics—is gaining increasing prominence. Different 
services emphasise different functions (Mills, Rorty, and Spencer, 2006). Of these three 
functions, case consultation, the “driving force” of clinical ethical infrastructure (Mills, 
Tereskerz, and Davis, 2005, 57), has received the most scholarly attention. It is “the most 
potentially volatile and the most labor-intensive” function (Moreno, 2009, 577). 
The CES function of education is considered by some clinical ethicists to be its most 
important and efficient function (Moreno, 2009). However it is relatively under-represented in 
the literature and there are few detailed descriptions and recommendations for the educative 
role of ethics support services (Chidwick et al., 2010). In most discussions, description of a 
service’s educational activity is limited to enumerating the types of ethics teaching activities that 
are commonly undertaken such as presenting a case or an issue at a Grand Rounds seminar, or 
conducting in-service training sessions for clinical staff. An exception to this is the educational 
method called “moral case deliberation” employed in some Dutch health care institutions 
(Weidema et al., 2012). 
The policy development function of ethics services is also not usually discussed in the 
literature at length. More typically it is limited to stating that an institution’s ethicist or 
committee frequently provides input into policies and guidelines. The neglect of the policy 
function of CES support has recently been noted elsewhere (Frolic et al., 2012), although 
exceptions to this are the descriptions of policy work by Ells (2006) and McDonald, Simpson, and 
O’Brien (2008). 
Further, there does not appear to have been any systematic evaluation of the process 
and impact of the educational and policy functions of CES services. Frolic et al. seek to redress 
the policy development knowledge gap, arguing that the policy review function is a distinctive 
practice requiring its own metrics, which the authors have developed (Frolic et al., 2012). 
In contrast to the education and policy functions, case consultation has been the subject 
of considerable debate and also significant attempts at reaching consensus on what best 
practice might look like. In a case consultation, clinicians, patients or their carers who are 
uncertain or troubled by a particular issue or decision may consult with a CES service much as 
they might seek the opinion and advice of colleagues with expertise in other specialty areas. The 
CES service (individual or committee) assists by clarifying the values and conflicts involved, 
advising on the ethical implications of the available courses of action and facilitating an ethically 
justified consensus on what should be done (Tarzian and the ABSH Core Competencies Update 
Task Force, 2013). Case consultation appears to be a central function of many CES services in the 
US but is less so in the UK (Slowther, McClimans, and Price, 2012) and other European nations 
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(Lebeer, 2005; Pfafflin, Kobert, and Reiter-Theil, 2009) where CES services are seen more as a 
“body for reflection” provided primarily to clinicians (Lebeer, 2005). 
There are differing approaches to both the role and method of clinical ethics 
consultation (Dzur, 2002) but the most commonly accepted approach is ethics facilitation. CES 
services have previously tended to lean towards one of two approaches: authoritarian or pure 
consensus, both of which are argued to be inadequate (Aulisio, Arnold, and Youngner, 2000; 
American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, 2011, 6-7). In the authoritarian approach, the 
ethicist (or clinical ethics committee) becomes the central figure in the deliberation; the expert 
making decisions and issuing binding recommendations. The obvious concern here for critics of 
CES is that the ethicist assumes decision-making authority—usurping the authority of the 
patient and the clinical team. 
In contrast, in the pure consensus approach the ethicist’s role is to broker consensus. 
While superficially this seems less problematic, even here the focus on consensus can 
compromise patient autonomy, for example where consensus between clinicians and the 
patient’s family overrides the wishes of the patient and thereby diminishes patient self-
determination (Aulisio, Arnold, and Youngner, 2000; American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities, 2011, 7). 
A third and now most widely adopted approach to CES services is “ethics facilitation”—
where consultation involves clarifying the value uncertainty or conflict involved and facilitating 
consensus—“agreement by all involved parties, whether that agreement concerns the 
substantively morally optimal solution or, more typically, who should be allowed to make the 
decision” (Aulisio, Arnold, and Youngner, 2000, 61). The ethics facilitation approach differs from 
the pure consensus approach in that it considers whether the consensus decision reached is 
ethically justified (Tarzian and the ABSH Core Competencies Task Force, 2013). 
A fourth function of CES services is to provide assistance with ethics at the level of the 
organization as opposed to the level of patient care. This usually entails working through the 
ethical issues involved in areas such as health care management, resource allocation and quality 
improvement (Dorries et al., 2011; McClimans, Slowther and Parker, 2012). This development 
reflects the rise in a “systems” approach which seeks to integrate clinical ethics into the 
institution and wider health care system. But while some of the field’s most influential scholars 
and practitioners have advocated for this model (Singer, Pellegrino, and Siegler, 2001; MacRae 
et al., 2005; Fox, 2010) a systems approach to clinical ethics remains to be widely adopted 
(MacRae et al., 2005). There are, however, a number of well-developed frameworks for 
implementing systems thinking in ethics support (Fox, 2010; MacRae et al., 2005; Nelson et al., 
2010a). All posit the mutual dependence of quality care and ethical principles. With reference to 
ethics, “quality” means that practices throughout an organization are consistent with the 
accepted ethical standards, norms, or expectations for the organization and its staff (Fox, 2010). 
Drawing on theoretical developments in disciplines such as organizational studies and social, 
cognitive, and cultural psychology, all share a commitment to ethics services having a more 
proactive role in the continuous quality improvement effort of the organization and system 
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within which it operates. In a systems approach, ethics support moves “upstream” to address 
systemic and structural elements that produce value conflict rather than remaining only at the 
level of the particulars of the issue or case at hand. This encourages a more proactive and 
preventative (the approach is some time labelled “preventive ethics”) form of ethics support 
(Fox, 2010; MacRae et al., 2005; Nelson et al., 2010a). 
Service Models 
“The ethics consultation team is ideally composed of individuals who bring a balance of the 
knowledge and skills requisite for effectively providing ethics consultation services. Although it is 
an open and empirical question whether such skills and knowledge are best delivered by teams 
or individual ethics consultants, it is certainly evident that both formats are thriving in a wide 
variety of health care settings” (Agich, 2009a, 14). 
As Agich indicates, there is considerable uncertainty about how best to deliver CES 
services. Three models are currently prevalent: the “ethicist” model of an individual with 
specialist training in ethics; the “clinical ethics committee” model—a multi-disciplinary group 
convened on a regular basis; and a small team model, often convened as a sub-group of the 
larger ethics committee. The individual ethicist model is more prevalent in the United States and 
Canada, while the committee model appears to be favoured in the UK, Europe and elsewhere 
(Larcher, Slowther, and Watson, 2010). 
Both models have strengths and weaknesses. The consultant model, for example, may 
be more flexibile and responsive (Aulisio, Arnold, and Youngner, 2000; Slowther, Hope, and 
Ashcroft, 2001), but also relies on the perspective of a single individual. In contrast, the major 
strength of the committee model of ethics support, which appears to be the most widely 
adopted model internationally, is that it brings multiple disciplines, professions and perspectives 
to bear in consideration of the issues or problem under debate (American Society for Bioethics 
and Humanities, 2011, 20). But while a larger group may provide better procedural practice, 
with it comes more constraints, such as meeting times and responsiveness to requests for case 
consultation. The ethics team model, which has been widely adopted in the US and elsewhere, 
attempts to address philosophical issues raised by single ethicists operating as expert ethics 
consultants and practical issues associated with large ethics committees performing 
contemporaneous case consultation (Fox, Myers, and Pearlman, 2007). In this model, a small 
number of members of the larger committee undertake consultation work, thereby allowing for 
a more timely response to a request for advice than is possible for the full committee. While a 
quicker response comes at the cost of the greater range of views offered by a multi-disciplinary 
committee, the ethics team can also contact members of the larger committee for advice. 
To date, few studies have systematically compared the different models of CES support. 
Increasingly, those engaged in ethics consultation advocate for a support service to combine all 
three models in order to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each 
(American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, 2011, 19; Fox, 2010). Fox (2010) recommended 
that the consultation task itself should determine which model is utilized. 
9 
 
While there is no consensus, there are a number of well-developed approaches. In the 
following section we briefly describe two with a systems-oriented approach. 
Integrated Ethics 
The IntegratedEthics program was developed by the National Center for Ethics in Health Care of 
the United States Government’s Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) which operates the largest 
integrated health care system in the United States (Fox, 2010). The IntegratedEthics approach 
was developed to address some of the perceived shortcomings of traditional approaches to CES 
services such as the lack of integration of CES into its host organization, lack of defined purpose 
and lack of standards and accountability for quality. The IntegratedEthics program is a 
standardized approach designed to help individual health care facilities improve “ethics quality” 
at three levels: decisions and actions, systems and processes, and environment and culture. The 
need to recognise levels is illustrated using an iceberg analogy; at the tip of the iceberg are 
ethically problematic decisions and practices; below these are the organizational systems and 
process that inform decisions and practices; and below these are the organizations’ ethical 
environment and culture which through values and norms almost imperceptibly shape ethics 
practices. 
The approach is structured around three core functions associated with each of the 
levels: ethics consultation targets ethics quality at the level of decisions and actions; preventive 
ethics targets the level of systems and processes; and ethical leadership targets the level of 
environment and culture. The IntegratedEthics approach to consultation, which is closely 
aligned with the ABSH Core Competencies approach, is captured in the acronym CASES: Clarify 
the consultation request, Assemble the relevant information, Synthesize the information, 
Explain the synthesis, Support the consultation process. The acronym ISSUES is used for 
preventive ethics at the systems level: Identify an issue, Study the issue, Select a strategy, 
Undertake a plan, Evaluate and adjust, Sustain and spread. At the environmental and cultural 
level, ethical leadership involves demonstrating that ethics is a priority, communicating clear 
expectations for ethical practice, practicing ethical decision-making and supporting institutional 
ethics programs. 
The Hub and Spokes Model 
A more recent innovation for providing ethics support is the “hub and spokes” strategy 
developed by the Joint Centre for Bioethics (JCB) at the University of Toronto, Canada in 
conjunction with ten affiliated hospitals (MacRae et al., 2005). The core approach of the strategy 
is to provide decentralized resources, with the “spokes,” coordinated by the centralized “hub.” 
The hub provides the bioethics expertise and leadership to the spokes. Clinicians and others 
organized along professional or departmental lines throughout the organization then act as a 
local ethics resource. 
The Hub and Spokes model tries to create an “ethics infrastructure” within health care 
organizations. The goal is for ethics support services to become fully integrated into the life of 
the organization it serves over time (MacRae et al., 2005). The model aims to foster an ethical 
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climate where the responsibility to be ethically engaged and aware is recognized from “those in 
the boardroom to those at the bedside” (MacRae et al., 2005, 257). The core innovation of the 
strategy is that builds capacity through ethical expertise “radiating” from the Hub, through the 
Spokes and to the clinical and general staff (MacRae et al., 2005). 
This diffusion of knowledge and skills is intended to overcome some of the limitations of 
the typical static model of ethics support where expertise remains concentrated in the individual 
consultant or committee. The Spokes reach out to all parts of the organization generating ethics 
awareness and competence and thereby minimising the perennial challenges of workload, peer 
support and isolation facing the lone ethicist (or committee). The strategy establishes an 
infrastructure of relationships within an organization which serves to both formalize previously 
implicit responsibilities and generate a commitment (or “buy-in”) to ethics at all levels; this 
helps address the problem of poor sustainability and limited accountability of traditional models 
of support. 
Evaluation of CES Services 
The proliferation of clinical ethics support has seen a rapidly growing literature, but there has 
been less by way of empirical research and evaluation of the CES process and outcomes. 
Empirical studies of clinical ethics support services are overwhelmingly descriptive in nature, 
with only a few attempting systematic evaluation. There is also no consensus in the literature as 
to how CES services should be evaluated (Schildmann et al., 2013). 
Most studies of ethics support services have sought to establish aspects such as: the 
prevalence of support services, their type, structure, composition, main functions, activities and 
processes (see for example McGee et al., 2001; Slowther et al., 2001, 2004; Slowther, 
McClimans, and Price, 2012; Godkin et al., 2005; Milmore, 2006; Fox, Myers, and Pearlman, 
2007; Frewer and Fahr, 2007; Swetz et al., 2007; Pedersen, Akre, and Førde, 2009; Romano et 
al., 2009; Whitehead et al., 2009; Kesselheim, Johnson, and Joffe, 2010; Gaudine et al., 2010; 
Nelson et al., 2010b; Tapper et al., 2010; Moeller et al., 2012). What these studies mostly show 
is the diversity of CES services. Many CES services provide all three of the core functions of 
education, policy review and development and consultation; but usually focus on one function. 
Some services are provided by a single ethicist; some by committees; others use both. Regarding 
consultations, many issue non-binding recommendations, a small number issue binding 
recommendations and some do not make any recommendations at all. Most ethics committees 
are multidisciplinary but vary in their membership mix and their mode of recruitment. Some 
committees have members with formal ethics training, many do not; legal expertise is 
represented on some committee but not on others. Some committees actively educate their 
members, while others do not or are unable to. Some services involve patients and families 
directly in their deliberative process and allow them to refer to the service, in many others 
support is primarily if not exclusively for clinicians (Fournier et al., 2009). Some committees have 
adopted systematic means of documenting their activities, others do not. Some services 
undertake to evaluate their activities, many do not. 
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A small number of studies have focussed on the interaction between a service and 
clinicians. Studies have looked at the types of ethical issues (variously referred to as inter alia—
problems, dilemmas, difficulties) that clinicians face; what issues prompt clinicians to seek 
ethical support; what enables or impedes access to support; clinician’s perceptions of the 
adequacy of ethics support available to them and their preferences for types of ethics support. 
Studies such as that by Du Val et al. (2001, 2004) and the Royal College of Physicians (2005) 
show ethics consultations are mostly requested for end-of-life issues, decisions about 
withdrawing “futile” treatments, and late-term abortions. Other frequently occurring issues 
include disagreement among clinicians, professional misconduct, and concerns related to truth-
telling and confidentiality. Dilemmas about justice, such as lack of insurance or limited 
resources, were rarely referred (Du Val, 2004). 
Many of these studies have investigated why clinicians do or do not seek ethics support. 
Findings suggest that clinicians tend to seek support for conflict resolution, reassurance about a 
decision, clarification of issues, new insights on a case and emotional support (Du Val et al., 
2001). Clinicians with ethics training appear to be more likely to request ethics support, 
although it is unclear whether this represents greater awareness of CES services, greater 
support for CES services or greater willingness to seek external review of clinical decisions or 
difficulties (Du Val et al., 2004; Hurst et al., 2007b). Clinicians often do not seek support because 
consultations are difficult to access, the process is time consuming or intimidating, the 
outcomes may be unhelpful, they may fear being scrutinized, fear loss of autonomy, or they may 
fear retaliation (Du Val et al., 2004; Førde, Pedersen, and Akre, 2008; Gaudine et al., 2011). 
Other possible reasons for underutilization include clinicians not being aware that a clinical 
support service exists, fear that a committee will worsen the situation (Gaudine et al., 2011) and 
placing a low value on shared decision making (Orlowski, et al., 2006). 
Two prospective studies by La Puma et al. (1988, 1992) collected descriptive information 
on consultations including the reason(s) for consultation, the characteristics of the patients 
involved, the clinicians’ satisfaction with the service and whether they would use it again. In 
both studies large majorities of clinicians found consultation helpful and nearly all indicated they 
would use the service in the future. Similar findings on the perceived helpfulness of 
consultations have been found in other studies of clinicians (Orr and Moon, 1993; McClung et 
al., 1996; Yen and Schneiderman, 1999). Interestingly, in those studies that have compared 
clinician with patient satisfaction, patients have been found to be less satisfied with ethics 
consultation (McClung et al., 1996; Yen and Schneiderman, 1999). 
A few studies have assessed clinical ethics support service using an experimental design. 
The best-known are a series of studies by Schneiderman and colleagues looking at the impact of 
ethics consultation in intensive care settings (Schneiderman, Gilmer, and Teetze, 2000; 
Schneiderman et al., 2003). These trials examined consultations involving parents who had 
“value laden” treatment conflicts as identified by clinicians. A single-centre trial and a multi-
centre trial were conducted, with patients randomized to the intervention (offer of ethics 
consultation) or control (not offered). Both trials found that ethics consultation was associated 
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with shorter hospital ICU stays, reduced use of services and less cost among those who did not 
survive to discharge. There were, however, no statistically significant differences between the 
intervention and control arms for those who survived to discharge. The results of these studies 
suggest that the intervention of ethics consultation was beneficial to patients who did not 
survive to hospital discharge and was not harmful to patients who did survive. The authors’ 
conclusion was that consultations “seem to be useful in resolving conflicts that may be 
inappropriately prolonging nonbeneficial or unwanted treatments at the end of life” 
(Schneiderman et al., 2003, 1172). A later cost analysis of data from the multi-centre trial 
confirmed the finding that ethics consultation was associated with a reduction hospital days and 
treatment costs (Gilmer et al., 2005). 
To summarise, there has been extensive uptake of CES services, most widely in the US 
but with increasing numbers in many other nations. Empirical studies (as well as more general 
reports) indicate that CES services vary considerably in form, function and activity. The limited 
and contested nature of evaluation of performance means the overall value of CES, its 
effectiveness, costs and benefits, cannot be precisely determined. And as we discuss below, the 
heterogeneity of CES and the paucity of evaluation have raised considerable concern about the 
quality and impact of CES services. 
Two particular concerns regarding case consultations arise from studies of CES 
services—the often low utilization by clinicians and lack of patient involvement in consultations. 
Empirical evidence suggests that many CES services have low rates of referral. According to the 
most recent data for the US (Fox, Myers, and Pearlman 2007) the median number of 
consultations for the year prior to the survey was 3. In the UK, Slowther, McClimans, and Price 
(2012) found half of the committees they survey had between 1–5 consultations in the previous 
year. Another relatively recent study of clinical ethics services in the United Kingdom led the 
researchers to conclude “At the moment, the stark reality about CECs in the UK is that clinicians 
are not using them” (Whitehead et al., 2009, 454). While this is an important observation, these 
data are limited in that they are not recent and where CES services are flourishing, rates of 
consultation are likely to be higher. 
It is widely acknowledged that there has been mixed success with establishing and 
maintaining CES support services. Some flourish, others fail to thrive (Conrad, 2006). Failure to 
thrive can arise from: a lack of clear purpose or lack of institutional support (Mills, Rorty, and 
Spencer, 2006); clinician reluctance to seek support because of factors such as fear of scrutiny or 
loss of authority; because they are not found to be helpful; because they are not trusted or 
simply because clinicians are not aware of them (DeRenzo Mokwunye and Lynch, 2006; 
UNESCO, 2005; Slowther, McClimans, and Price, 2012). No particular model appears to be any 
more likely to flourish or fail to thrive than any other. 
The low rates of consultation experienced by many services might indicate that what is 
being offered is seen by many clinicians as neither desirable nor warranted. A low rate of 
referral could mean that clinicians do not perceive a need for ethics support. Neither the 
“bottom-up” development nor increased prevalence of support services show how widely the 
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need for ethics support is shared among clinicians. With only a small number of studies 
attempting to empirically establish need among clinicians (Larcher, Lask and Mcarthy, 1997; 
Slowther, 1998; Racine and Hayes, 2006), need for formal clinical ethics support appears more 
assumed than systematically, empirically established (Williamson, 2007; Dauwerse et al., 2011). 
Many CES services do not appear to facilitate the direct participation of patients and 
their families in the consultation process (e.g., Newson, Neitzke, and Reiter-Theil, 2009). There 
has also been contention in the literature as to whether patients should be involved in ethics 
case consultations and if so, to what degree. Some have claimed that where consultations have 
a direct bearing on care, the lodestars of clinical ethics support are potentially undermined, 
namely, patient autonomy and self-determination (Wolf, 1992), raising important questions 
about due process (McLean, 2007, 2009). This concern has been expressed most forcefully in the 
US, with critics of CES fearing that a creeping quasi-legal status may become attached to the 
deliberations of committees and consultants (Pope, 2009), reflecting the possibility that, as 
McLean (2008) has observed, it is “all-too-easy move from advice to authority and from 
commentary to decision-making” (2008, 101). Even if the consultant (or committee) issues non-
binding advice, this may still impact on subsequent actions (McLean, 2007). In cases where a 
consultation involves a dispute between the patient (and family) and the clinical team, there is a 
need to ensure some degree of procedural fairness; all parties in a dispute have the right to a 
fair hearing. Attention to formal justice and due process is considered particularly important 
(McLean, 2007). 
Optimizing the Quality of CES Services 
The heterogeneity of CES and the paucity of evaluation have given rise to concerns about the 
quality of CES services. Tulsky and Fox have claimed, for example, that: “Despite all that has 
been written about this field, two fundamental questions remain unanswered. First, does ethics 
consultation offer measurable benefits worthy of the current investment of time and money? 
Second, if it is effective, which models are the most effective and under what conditions are 
different models more or less effective?” (1996, 111). 
According to Magill (2013), quality has become the preeminent discourse on CES 
services in the US (and elsewhere). The heterogeneity of CES services, given a lack of standards 
of practice, oversight and accountability, is likely to be matched by variation in service quality 
(Aulisio, Arnold, and Youngner, 2000; Slowther, 2008; Frolic and PHEEP Steering Committee, 
2012; Schiedermayer and La Puma, 2012). Quality, particularly in regards to case consultation, is 
predominantly concerned with the competence of CES services—that is, whether they 
command the necessary knowledge and skills in ethics and health law. Given that the evidence 
indicates many people involved in CES have only rudimentary training in philosophical ethics 
(e.g., Fox, Myers, and Pearlman, 2007; Slowther, McClimans, and Price, 2012), claims to ethics 
expertise are often questionable. Claims to moral expertise are also subject to critique on more 
theoretical grounds, such as debate over what moral expertise is. We discuss this further below. 
For some, this worryingly indicates that well-meaning but inexpert consultants or 
committees are having a potentially decisive influence on decisions about patient care (Fletcher 
14 
 
and Hoffmann, 1994; Dubler and Blustein, 2007; Courtwright, et al., 2014). Clinical ethicists have 
responded by devoting significant intellectual and material effort to develop standards of 
practice for CES and develop appropriate and rigorous methods to evaluate quality (e.g., Tarzian 
and ABSH Core Competencies Update Taskforce, 2013; Larcher, Slowther, and Watson, 2010). 
The most significant development in practice standards has been the Core Competencies 
developed by the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities, first issued in 1998 (Society for 
Health and Human Values–Society for Bioethics Consultation, 1998) and more recently updated 
(American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, 2011; Tarzian and ASBH Core Competencies 
Update Taskforce, 2013). The foundational assertion of the Core Competencies is “that HCEC 
done well by competent HCE consultants benefits stakeholders, and HCEC done poorly by 
unqualified HCE consultants either fails to benefit or harms stakeholders” (Tarzian and ASBH 
Core Competencies Update Task Force, 2013, 3). The Core Competencies focus on the 
knowledge, skills and character traits that any service (consultant or committee) must have to 
adequately perform as an ethical consultation service. The knowledge required is wide-ranging 
and calls for targeted recruitment of suitable members or co-opting relevant expertise as it is 
needed. The values required of a committee are described as “aspirations” to be acquired over 
time similar to professional development. While there is limited evidence on the extent to which 
the Core Competencies are applied by individual services, and whilst there is some concern that 
emphasis on competencies reflects the malign influence of managerialism and may divert CES 
from the primary goal of moral inquiry towards more institutional or bureaucratic goals (King, 
1999; Bishop, Fanning, and Bliton, 2009), there is little doubt that debate about the 
competencies of CES has had a significant impact on the establishment of standards for CES 
services (Adams, 2009; Bishop, Fanning, and Bliton, 2009). 
A parallel development to developing practice standards to enhance quality has been 
the push to professionalise clinical ethics expertise (Tarzian, 2009; Childs, 2009; Frolic and 
PHEEP Steering Committee, 2012; Acres et al., 2012; Reel, 2012). For some, professionalization 
is not only necessary and desirable but also inevitable given the increasing emphasis on 
standards, quality and accountability, concerns about medical liability and the emergence of the 
patient safety movement (Acres et al., 2012). More generally, both advocates and critics of CES 
agree that in order to fulfil their function and meet the expectations and needs of relevant 
stakeholders the people doing the work of clinical ethics consultation (CEC) should be able to 
demonstrate at least minimal levels of competence (Tarzian, 2009). 
On our reading, the predominant theme in the literature addressing quality is that CES 
services are too often underpowered; they lack ethics expertise, standards and evaluable 
outcomes; they engage consultants who lack professional standing; they are poorly integrated 
into their organization and consequently are under-used; they are frequently under-resourced, 
and they have unproven benefits. The main solution offered is further institutionalization, 
through the standardization of consultation, the professionalization of consultants, a thorough 
integration into its host organization and having CES more generally incorporated into a 
particular health care system. The influence of the Core Competencies, the accelerating push to 
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professionalise consultants (at least in the US) and the prominence of integrated approaches 
such as the VA’s IntegratedEthics model suggest that institutionalization is well under way. 
Institutionalization, however, has its critics. The concern is that standardization and 
professionalization risks overpowering the very clinicians and patients it is meant to serve. 
Institutionalization can inflate the authority of CES at the expense of patients, may homogenise 
practice, diminish moral inquiry and result in CES being co-opted as a tool for risk-management 
and saving money. Others are concerned that standardization forces ethics consultation towards 
procedural efficiency and metrics and away from the substantive goods of the case at hand. A 
focus on standardized, measurable process can limit the capacity of a CES service to reveal, 
clarify and perhaps challenge the various understandings, of all parties, of what is a medical 
good, an institutional good and what a patient holds as good (Bishop, Fanning, and Bliton, 2009). 
There has also been resistance to the notion of an ethics “expert” from the inception of 
CES services (Bishop, Fanning, and Bliton, 2009) and this has been a significant obstacle for 
establishing CES and gaining patronage (Rasmussen, 2011a). The notion of expertise in ethics is 
a complicated matter that involves both metaphysical and epistemological questions of whether 
expertise in ethics is actually possible and moral and normative questions of whether such 
expertise and the authority it brings is desirable (Noble, 1982; Yoder, 1998; Rasmussen, 2011a). 
Critics of ethics expertise such as Scofield (2008) and Smith (2001) argue that expertise 
presumes access to facts or consensus among practitioners. In the absence of any moral 
consensus among ethicists, holding actual “expertise” on moral issues simply isn’t possible 
(Engelhardt, 2009; Scofield, 2008). As Shalit argues, “[t]he philosopher’s recommendation 
depends on a set of criteria that is not agreed upon, but varies from culture to culture and, more 
and more, from individual to individual” (1997, 24). For some critics (e.g., Noble, 1982), even if 
ethics expertise is possible, it may not be desirable because it shifts moral authority from the 
patient, and their carer, to the ethics expert, thereby undermining the agency and autonomy of 
both and challenging the very principles of democracy upon which the idea of CES is based 
(Scofield, 2008). 
Advocates of CES argue that ethics expertise need not involve any metaphysical claim 
regarding moral truths or the claim that clinical ethicists have epistemic access to such truths 
(Yoder, 1998; Steinkamp, Gordijn, and ten Have, 2008; Rasmussen, 2011a, 2011b). According to 
Rasmussen (2011a), metaphysical objections largely stem from the ambiguity of the term 
“moral expertise”. She claims that expertise here should be conceived as a “facility with moral 
arguments” (2011a, 649) rather than “possession of moral truth” (2011a, 649). Ethics expertise 
involves a “superior familiarity with context” (2011a, 651) where the consultant uses her 
training and knowledge to guide the parties involved through the relevant “facts” (laws, policies, 
norms, cultural values) to a more informed understanding of the situation (Rasmussen, 2011a). 
Ethics expertise, as opposed to moral expertise, involves making “non-normatively binding 
recommendations grounded in a pervasive ethos or practice within a particular context” 
(Rasmussen, 2011a, 650). Steinkamp, Gordijn, and ten Have (2008) use a similar definition of 
ethics expertise, that is, the capacity to provide “strong justifications” to argue that the dialogue 
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between the expert ethicist and clinicians is a cogently democratic means of reaching consensus 
on the moral norms at hand (Steinkamp, Gordijn, and ten Have, 2008). In this dialogue, the 
expertise of the ethicist complements and enhances the moral competence of the non-ethicists, 
clinicians (and patients) by clarifying what is ethically at stake (Steinkamp, Gordijn, and ten 
Have, 2008). Conceived as such, ethics expertise does not make a metaphysical claim that there 
are moral truths and that clinical ethicists have epistemic access to such truths, does not usurp 
the autonomy and agency of the non-expert and offers expertise but does not assume authority 
(Rasmussen, 2011a). 
Evaluating the quality of a clinical ethics services is therefore an area of considerable 
uncertainty and debate. Major criticism has been voiced at evaluating clinical ethics services 
using outcome measurements more suitable for standard clinical interventions. It is not clear to 
some observers that quantitative measures, such as tallying the tasks performed by a service, 
measuring user satisfaction or calculating cost savings are appropriate for assessing the quality 
of a clinical ethics service (Mills, Tereskerz, and Davis, 2005; Gordon, 2007; Williamson, 2007; 
Pfafflin, Kobert, and Reiter-Theil, 2009). The number of consultations a service provides is 
clearly not a proxy for quality. One ethics committee may conduct a large number of 
consultations but be a little more than a rubber stamp; another committee may conduct fewer 
consultations but provide rigorous ethical analysis (Williamson, 2007). While user satisfaction 
with an ethics service may be helpful in assessing service quality, there are some difficulties with 
it. Williamson (2007) advises caution in using satisfaction, firstly because its validity as a 
measure of quality is suspect given its inherent subjectivity, and secondly because often only 
clinicians and not patients are asked to participate. 
A number of authors have voiced concern at the use of cost-savings to evaluate the 
effectiveness of CES (e.g., Mills, Tereskerz, and Davis, 2005; Rasmussen, 2006, 2011b). 
Rasmussen (2006) argues that if cost saving is the measure by which an ethics service is 
evaluated, there could be significant pressure on CES services to achieve savings, such as 
providing advice that encourages less costly decisions. Mills, Tereskerz, and Davis (2005) 
similarly argue that savings may come to rival if not dominate the integral goals of consultation 
resulting not only in consultation emphasising the least costly options but in making 
consultation mandatory for cases where costs may be saved, for example end of life care 
decisions. The potential for co-optation of CES services as a cost-saving measure (which 
Rasmussen (2006) labels as a “sinister innovation”) could result in a profound loss of trust 
among clinicians (and patients) if they come to perceive this as the primary objective of 
consultation “If the ‘quality’ or effectiveness of an outcome has any relationship to trust, as it 
should in healthcare-related activities, then quality will be eroded, as stakeholders understand 
that cost savings may be one of the reasons for initiating a consultation” (Mills, Tereskerz, and 
Davis, 2005, 60). 
Conclusion 
The story of CES services is one of increasing expansion and advocacy for its potential benefits. It 
is also a cautionary tale about the challenges involved in ensuring competency and viability. A 
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review of the literature and the international experience with CES services suggests that they 
have considerable potential to prevent and resolve moral conflicts, minimise moral distress, 
support patient autonomy and enhance institutional efficiency and cost-effectiveness. But while 
these benefits are highly plausible, the ad hoc development and heterogeneity of CES services 
and the lack of consensus over the evaluation of their performance raises some doubts about 
how often they are achieved. Many questions remain to be answered regarding the structure, 
function and organizational model for CES support. Where should CES services be located within 
hospital structures? How independent should they be? Should CES provide contemporaneous 
case consultation or retrospective case review? Should case consultation be provided by 
“experts”? Should the deliberations of CES services be advisory or binding (or neither)? Who 
should be the primary beneficiary of CES support? How should potential conflicts of interest be 
managed? While it is crucial that institutions seeking to establish CES services and those working 
in clinical ethics confront these issues, questions about CES should not obscure the fact that CES 
services have primarily spread because those involved in patient care have recognized the need 
for support. These questions should also not diminish the significant intellectual effort devoted 
to thinking through the appropriate purposes and best practices of CES services. There are now 
decades of collective experience and scholarship, well-established approaches and detailed 
models and guidelines from which those seeking to establish a CES service can draw. 
Experience suggests that to be active and sustainable, a CES service must be visible, 
accessible, understood and trusted. These in turn require the service to be clear in purpose; fully 
integrated into the life of the organization; adequately resourced; appropriately constituted and 
competent; accountable (transparent and assessable), and independent. Ongoing evaluative 
research should be a core component of the development of CES services. This will have three 
distinct benefits—it will enable evaluation of clinical ethics services; it will strengthen the 
culture of ethical inquiry and ethical practice within the health service; and it will provide 
opportunities to increase understanding of issues of ethical and legal importance in the design 
and delivery of health care. It is crucial that ongoing research into clinical ethics is conducted in 
order to establish what is necessary for clinical ethics services to work. 
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